Market response to internationalization strategies: Evidence from Indian cross-border acquisitions  by Rani, Neelam et al.
IIMB Management Review (2015) 27, 80e91ava i lab le a t www.sc ienced i rec t . com
ScienceDirect
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / i imb Production and hosting by ElsevierMarket response to internationalization
strategies: Evidence from Indian
cross-border acquisitionsNeelam Rani a,*, Surendra S. Yadav b,1, P.K. Jain b,2aRajiv Gandhi Indian Institute of Management Shillong, Shillong, Meghalaya, India
bDepartment of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, India
Available online 21 April 2015KEYWORDS
Event study;
Stock market valuation;
Cross-border mergers
and acquisitions;
India;
Shareholder value;
Emerging market;
Developed market* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ91
9958934508 (mobile); fax: þ91 364 22
E-mail addresses: neelam.iitd@gmai
Rani), ssyadav@dms.iitd.ac.in (S.S. Y
(P.K. Jain).
1 Tel.: þ9111 26591242; fax: þ91
26591199; fax: þ9111 26862620.
Peer-review under responsibility of Ind
Bangalore.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.201
0970-3896 ª 2015 Indian Institute ofAbstract The paper provides evidence that shareholders of acquirer Indian corporations
engaging in cross-border transactions experience a statistically significant positive average
abnormal return on the announcement day as well as cumulative average abnormal returns
over multi-day event windows. The gains are significantly positive and higher for the acquisi-
tions of targets in developed markets. The regression analysis in the paper highlights that
cross-border acquisitions of high tech sector target firms in developed markets generate better
wealth. Further, relatively larger acquisitions create higher gains.
ª 2015 Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights reserved.Introduction
Internationalization is the process of increasing involve-
ment in international operations across borders (Welch &
Luostarinen, 1988). Internationalization strategy has been
a major dimension of the on-going strategy process of364 2308044 (O), þ91
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Management Bangalore. Productiomajority of emerging multinational firms. Internationali-
zation strategies depend on the dynamism of prevailing
conditions in global as well as domestic markets. Interna-
tionalization of firms from emerging economies is also
motivated by learning objectives that allow these firms to
overcome the initial resource hurdles arising due to tech-
nological gaps (Li, 2010). As a result of the liberalization
policy since 1991, the Indian economy witnessed dramatic
growth, changes in domestic market, and firm activities
specifically in relation to their expansion strategies across
borders. Indian firms began to develop their existing skills
in production capabilities and process R&D by acquiring
technology focussed firms in advanced markets. Indian
companies are venturing abroad in the software, biotech-
nology, automotive and oil sectors. Companies such as
Ranbaxy Laboratories, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Wockhardt
Ltd, and Nicholas Piramal India Ltd in the pharmaceuticaln and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Wipro, in the information technology sector; and Bharat
Forge Limited in the automobile sector have successfully
adopted internationalization strategies and have become
globally competitive. India has transformed its image from
being a foreign direct investment (FDI) destination to a
major emerging foreign direct investor (Pradhan, 2008).
The strategies adopted by Indian companies for their
internationalization are: outsourcing, geographic diversifi-
cation, joint ventures, and cross-border mergers and
acquisitions.
Crosseborder acquisitions are an important corporate
strategy that enables firms to extend their current businesses
to new markets, leverage their current capabilities, and
diversify into related markets. In addition, crosseborder ac-
quisitions can be an important mechanism for corporate
governance convergence (Wang & Xie, 2009). The acquisition
based strategy of internationalization adopted by Indian en-
terprises in recent years by acquiring strategic assets such as
technology, known brands, access to customers, and global
footprints has resulted in the emergence of new corporate
players on the global scene from an emerging economy
(Kumar, 2008). Acquisition is the route preferred by Indian
corporates for international expansion as compared to
organic routes adopted in developed markets. Kumar (2008)
documents that motivation for cross-border acquisitions and
outward FDI has shifted from market-seeking strategies
(during 1970s and 1980s) to strategic asset-seeking strategies
recently. He also reports the changing pattern in investment
flow to developing countries during 1990s to developed
countries in 2000s. Pradhan (2004) analyses the determinants
of internationalization of Indian manufacturing firms. He
suggests that the production activities of Indian firms abroad
are influenced by liberalization initiatives during the 1990s to
a certain extent. India’s economic environment during liber-
alization went throughmany transformations such as removal
of restrictions on imports, liberalization of FDI policy and
launching of several trade promotion measures. The Indian
pharmaceutical and IT industries chose internationalization
as an important part of their strategy to succeed in this new
liberalised policy regime.
The last two decades have witnessed significant inter-
nationalization of firms from emerging markets in terms of
their greater participation in international trade, growing
outflows of FDI, and a surge in their cross-border mergers
and acquisition activity. The internationalization activity of
firms from emerging economies may reflect attempts to
acquire strategic assets such as new technologies and
brands, and to secure access to raw materials and distri-
bution networks. In sum, rather than exploiting existing
assets, FDI may reflect attempts to acquire or augment
strategic and other assets. AT Kearney’s (2008) study of
global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) reveals that India has
been at the forefront of the M&A activity among developing
countries. Indian acquirers accounted for 29 percent of
M&A deals by developing market firms during 2002e2007.
In this context, the present paper aims to examine the
stock price reaction to the announcements of cross-border
acquisitions and to investigate if cross-border acquisition
announcements create value for the shareholders of the
acquiring firm in the short-term. The objective of the pre-
sent paper is to examine the short-term abnormal returns tothe shareholders of acquiring companies. Internationalizing
with cross-border acquisitions also helps the acquirers to
increase operational efficiency and flexibility by exploiting
market imperfections and expanding beyond boundaries.
However, these factors influence the acquirers differently
when the target firms are located in developed markets as
against emerging markets (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000;
Krugman, 1991; Shrivastava, 1986). Indian acquirers are
expected to experience synergies from acquiring target
firms in developed markets by gaining access to the pro-
duction and new technology know-how and distribution
channels. Indian firms are acquiring target firms in estab-
lished and mature markets to realize synergies of the low-
cost base structure. It also facilitates the acquiring firms
with the strong management expertise of target firms in
developed markets. The target firms in emerging markets
offer unique challenges to the acquirers as these markets
are at a different level of economic development. Little
transparency, and lack of available information tend to
hamper the process of due diligence when the target firms
are located in emerging markets (Bhagat, Malhotra, & Zhu,
2011; Kose, Steven, Nguyen, & Vasudevan, 2010). To
explore the factors influencing the direction and magnitude
ofmarket reaction, the disaggregate analysis for returns due
to announcement of cross-border acquisitions has also been
attempted. The disaggregated analysis has been done in
terms of targets in developed and emerging markets. The
present paper observes that cross-border acquisitions create
value for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. The
regression analysis in the paper highlights that cross-border
acquisitions of high tech sector target firms in developed
markets generate better wealth. Further, relatively larger
acquisitions create higher gains.
For better exposition, the paper is organized into six
sections including this section. The second section reviews
the previous empirical research work related to cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. The third section ex-
plains the methodology used. Data collection and sample
selection related issues have been delineated in the fourth
section. The major findings and concluding observations are
contained in the fifth and sixth sections respectively.Review of literature
There is voluminous literature analysing the success of
mergers and acquisitions activity. The purpose of this paper
is to assess the success of cross-border acquisitions pre-
dominantly from the point of view of the shareholders of
the acquiring companies. Accordingly, the review of
empirical work is primarily focussed on studies measuring
the implications of cross-border transactions on the share-
holder wealth of the acquiring companies. Many studies
have used the event study methodology and found a posi-
tive short-term announcement effect of the cross-border
M&As on the acquiring firms’ stock returns (Harris &
Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Morck &
Yeung, 1992). Contrary to this, studies on acquirers of do-
mestic firms have found on an average negative or at most
insignificant return for the shareholders (Healy, Palepu, &
Ruback, 1992; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Sirower, 1997;
Walker, 2000).
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abnormal returns from cross-border deals Aw & Chatterjee,
2004; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Campa & Hernando, 2004;
Carnes, Black, & Jandik, 2001; Chatterjee & Aw, 2000 (UK
firms); Conn, Cosh, Guest, & Hughes, 2005; Eckbo &
Thorburn, 2000 (Canadian firms); Mangold & Lippok, 2008;
and Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). In marked contrast
Cakici, Hessel, & Tandon, 1996; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991;
and Kang, 1993 have documented wealth gain for foreign
firms acquiring US firms.
Doukas and Travlos (1988) investigated the multinational
network hypothesis for US acquiring firms and report that,
on an average, there is no significant impact on acquirers’
wealth but the acquiring firm experiences significant posi-
tive returns when it is entering new markets or new in-
dustries and the expansion is into less developed economies
where the firm has no existing operation.
A few studies (Conn et al. 2005; Goergen & Renneboog,
2004; Mangold & Lippok, 2008; Moeller & Schlingemann,
2005) have explored the implications of cross-border
versus domestic acquisitions for acquirers.
Regional domicile hypothesis considers geographic in-
fluence on the performance of acquiring firms, and the
market reaction to their strategic activities has been
examined by Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Krugman, 1991;
and Shrivastava, 1986.
Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan (2008) examine the
impact of geographical proximity on the acquisition de-
cisions of US public firms from 1990 to 2003. They argue
that information advantages facilitate acquisition of tar-
gets that, on average, create higher overall return.
Recently, Kose et al., (2010); Zhu (2011); Zhu, Jog, and
Otchere (2011) and Bhagat et al. (2011) have examined the
wealth implications of cross-border acquisitions in a multi
country context. Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor
(2010); Karels, Lawrence, and Yu (2011); Zhu and
Malhotra (2008) observe positive returns for cross-border
acquisitions by emerging market firms.
Geographical diversification is one of the enablers of the
benefits of cross-border acquisitions that enables acquiring
firms to internationalize and use their strategic advantages
in overseas markets. The benefits of inter-country diversi-
fication are not the same for all the international markets
in which the acquiring firm acquires target firms. Regional
domicile hypothesis considers geographic influence on the
performance of acquiring firms. A disaggregated analysis
has been conducted on the basis of geographic origin of
target firms to examine the performance of the acquirers of
cross-border acquisitions. The sample of cross-border
acquisition has been segregated for target firms in devel-
oped markets and emerging markets.
A developed market is a country that is most developed in
terms of its economy and capital markets. In this paper,
developed economies are defined as those that are classified
as upper-income economies by the World Bank following
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003). Further, the country has
openness to foreign ownership, ease of capital movement,
and efficiency ofmarket institutions, alongwith high income.
In this paper, emerging markets are defined using the
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) classification
following Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks, and Oomes (2004),
which designates a country as an emerging marketaccording to a number of factors such as GDP per capita,
local government regulations, perceived investment risk,
foreign ownership limits and capital controls, and other
factors. The main motivation for using this classification is
that it captures the notion that emerging countries have
access to international capital markets. All other markets
constitute the emerging market group.
Despite a considerable volume of research on corporate
mergers and acquisitions, results are still inconclusive
regarding the valuation effects of acquisitions on acquiring
companies’ share price. This paper adds value to the
existing literature, as many influencing factors in cross-
border acquisitions by emerging market firms are substan-
tially different from those in the developed market.
Following regional domicile hypothesis, this work contrib-
utes to the extant literature by conducting a disaggregated
analysis between acquisitions of targets in developed
markets and emerging markets. The present paper is
related to recent work by Gubbi et al. (2010) but we focus
on the geographic impact and conduct a disaggregated
analysis on two groups. We have used a variety of tests to
check the robustness of the statistical significance of the
event study results.
Methodology
The event study methodology is used to examine short-term
stock price reaction to the announcements of cross-border
acquisitions.
We define the announcement day as the day when the
stock exchange is informed about the board approval of the
M&A deal. The dates are manually verified from the ar-
chives of corporate announcements of the stock exchange.
Estimation window of 255 (290, 36) days has been used.
The cumulative abnormal returns over alternate win-
dows have been also calculated in order to account for:
1) early share price reactions induced by the anticipation
of the stock market of an upcoming announcement
before the event, and
2) potentially slow information processing after the event.
We have observed the abnormal return over (20,2),
(5,0), (1,0), (0, 0), (0,þ1), (0,þ5), (þ2,þ20), (1,þ1),
(2,þ2),(5,þ5),(10,þ10) and (20,þ20) to capture the
leakage effect. In addition, the abnormal returns are
observed during an expanded event window of (20, þ60)
to understand the impact of information flow that
happened over a period of time. The dates have been
manually verified from the archives of corporate an-
nouncements of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) to
ascertain the clean period data. It has been manually
checked that there is no contamination of information and
confounding event during the event window.
Stock returns move in response to several firm or
market-specific factors. The key issue in event studies is
what portion of the price movement is actually caused by
the event of interest. In other words, we have to extract
the impact of the one particular event on stock returns.
This leads to the concept of abnormal returns. The
abnormal returns of the jth stock (ARjt) is obtained by
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of the event (E(Rjt)), from the actual return in the event
period, (Rjt):
ARjtZRjt  E

Rjt
 ð1Þ
The market model approach relates the return of a se-
curity to the return of the market portfolio in the following
manner and the market model equation is expressed as
follows:
RjtZaj þ bjRmt þ εjt; where tZ 290. 36 ð2Þ
where aj is a constant term for the j
th stock, bj is the
market beta of the jth stock, Rmt is the market returns, and
εjt is an error term.
The parameters of the model are estimated by using the
time-series data from the estimation period that precedes
each individual announcement. The estimated parameters
are then used in the calculation of abnormal returns for
each day in the event window. The daily excess return of
firm j for the day t (ARjt) is estimated from actual returns
during the event period and the estimated coefficients from
the estimation period:
ARjtZRjt 
baþ bbRmt; where tZ 20.þ 20 ð3Þ
The average abnormal return (AARt) for each day in the
event window is calculated as follows:
AARtZ
1
N
XN
jZ1
ARjt ð4Þ
where N is the number of firms.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are daily
abnormal returns cumulated over part of the event period.
Over an interval of two or more trading days beginning with
day T1 and ending with day T2, the cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) is
CAART1 ;T2Z
1
N
XN
jZ1
XT2
tZT1
ARjt ð5Þ
The null hypotheses being tested are:
H01: The abnormal return on the announcement of cross-
border acquisition is zero.
H02: The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for
the event window period on the announcements of cross-
border acquisitions is zero.
Following Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) we use
two parametric and two non-parametric test statistics to
test for the significance of average and cumulative average
abnormal returns over the event period. The four tests are:
1. Crude dependence adjustment (CDA) test (Brown &
Warner, 1980)
2. Standardized cross-sectional (SCS) test (Boehmer,
Masumeci, & Poulsen, 1991)
3. Generalized sign (GSign Z) test (Cowan, 1992)
4. Rank test (Corrado, 1989)Crude dependence adjustment test
The CDA test incorporates the sample time-series standard
deviation. Brown and Warner (1980) describe the test as
featuring a ‘‘crude dependence adjustment”. That is, the
test compensates for potential dependence of returns across
security-events by estimating the standard deviation using
the time series of sample mean returns from the estimation
period. The CDA test uses a single variance estimate for the
entire sample. Therefore, the time series standard test does
not take account of the unequal return variances across se-
curities. This test avoids the potential problem of cross-
sectional correlation of security return. To account for the
dependence across firms’ average residuals, in event time,
Brown andWarner (1980) suggest that the standard deviation
of average residuals should beestimated from the time series
of the average abnormal returns over the estimation period.
The estimated variance of AARt is
bs2AARZP36tZ290 AARt AAR2254 ð6Þ
where the market model parameters are estimated over
the estimation period of 255 days and
AARZ
P36
tZ290 AARt
255
ð7Þ
the test statistics for day t in event time is
tZ
AARtbsAAR ð8Þ
The CDA test for the null hypothesis that CAAR Z 0 is
tZ
CAARt
ðT2  T1 þ 1Þ
1
2bsAAR ð9Þ
Standardized cross-sectional test
The standardized cross-sectional test developed by
Boehmer et al. (1991) incorporates the information from
both estimation and the event period. The event period
abnormal returns are first standardized by estimation
period standard deviation. The cross-sectional technique is
then applied to the standardized abnormal returns.
The standardized abnormal return of security j for day t
(SARjt) is defined as abnormal returns of security j divided
by its estimated standard deviation as in equation (10)
SARjtZ
ARjt
dARjt
: ð10Þ
where d2ARjtZ
PTDe
kZTDb
ðARjkÞ2
Dj2
"
1þ 1Dj þ
ðRmtRmÞPTDe
kZTDb
ðRmkRmÞ
2
#Total standardized abnormal return (TSAR) has been
obtained by summing SARjt across the sample:
TSARtZ
XN
jZ1
SARjt: ð11Þ
For day t in the event period, the test statistic is
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TSARt
N
1
2ðdSARtÞ
ð12Þ
where
d2SARtZ
1
N 1
XN
iZ1
 
SARit  1
N
XN
jZ1
SARjt
!2
This correction for serial correlation can be extended to
multi-period window as:
Define the standardized cumulative abnormal return for
stock j as
SCART1j ;T2jZ
 
CART1j ;T2j
dCART1j ;T2j
!
ð13Þ
where
d2CART1 ;T2
Z
PTDe
kZTDb
AR2jk
Dj  2
8>>><>>>:
Lj
266666666
1þ Lj
Dj
þ
 PT2
tZT1
Rmt  LjRm
!2
PDj
kZ1

Rmk  R
.
m
2
377777777
9>>>=>>>;
where L is the length of the event period in trading days,
L Z T2-T1þ1. Dj is the number of non-missing trading day
returns in the D-day interval TDb through TDe used to esti-
mate the parameter of the firm j.
Then the SCS test for the null hypothesis that CAARZ 0 is
ztZ
PN
iZ1 SCART1j ;T2j
N
1
2

dSCARðT1j ;T2jÞ
 ð14Þ
where
d2SCARðT1j ;T2jÞ
Z
1
N 1
XN
iZ1
 
SCART1i ;T2i 
1
N
XN
jZ1
SCART1j ;T2j
!2
This test statistic allows for event-induced variance.
Generalized sign test
The generalized sign test compares the proportion of positive
abnormal returns around an event to the proportion from a
period unaffected by the event. The generalized sign test
adjusts for the fraction of positive abnormal returns in the
estimation period instead of assuming 0.5 (Cowan, 2007).
The null and alternative hypotheses of interest are:
The null hypothesis for generalized sign test is that
fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation
period.
The actual test uses the normal approximation to the
binomial distribution. To implement this test, we first need
to determine the proportion of stocks in the sample that
should have non-negative abnormal returns under the null
hypothesis of no abnormal performance. The value for the
null is estimated as the average fraction of stocks with non-
negative abnormal returns in the estimation period. If
abnormal returns are independent across securities, under
the null hypothesis the number of non-negative values of
abnormal returns has a binomial distribution with param-
eter p.The generalized sign test examines whether the number
of stocks with positive cumulative abnormal returns in the
event window exceeds the number expected in the absence
of abnormal performance. The number expected is based
on the fraction of positive abnormal returns in the 255 day
estimation period,
bpZ1
n
Xn
jZ1
1
255
X255
tZ1
Sjt ð15Þ
Where
SjtZ

1 if ARjt > 0
0 otherwise
The following statistic has an approximate unit normal
distribution with parameterbp:
ZGZ
w nbpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nbpð1 bpÞp ð16Þ
Where w is the number of stocks in the event window for
which the cumulative abnormal return is positive.
The alternative hypothesis, for any level of abnormal
performance, is that the proportion is different from that
prior.
Rank test
The rank test (Corrado, 1989) procedure considers the
combined estimation period and event period as a single set
of returns, and assigns a rank to each daily for each firm.
The rank statistic for day zero is:
ZrankZ
" 
1
N
XN
jZ1
kj0
!
 ~k
#,
sk ð17Þ
where kj0 is the rank of security-event j’s day zero
abnormal return in security-event j’s combined 255-day
estimation period and 19-day event period (in case of
(þ2,þ20) time series, k is the expected rank defined below,
and sk is the time-series standard deviation of the sample
mean abnormal return ranks.
Each security-event’s non-missing returns have been
ranked with the lowest rank being one. Ej represents the
number of non-missing returns of security j in the event
period; if there is no missing return, EjZ EZ post epre þ1
and D Z length of estimation window. The mean rank
across the combined estimation and event period is
~kZ
Dþ Eþ 1
2
The rank test statistic for the event window composed of
days T1 and T2 is
ZrankZðT2  T1 þ 1Þ
1
2
8>>><>>>:
KT1T2  ~K
PDþE
tZ1

Kt  ~K
2
Dþ E
1
2
9>>>=>>>;
; ð18Þ
where
KT1T2Z
1
T2T1þ1
PT2
tZT1
1
n
Pn
jZ1Kjt is the average rank across
the n securities and T2T1þ1 days of the event window and
Table 2 Geographical distribution of cross-border acqui-
sitions by Indian MNCs (2003e08).
Country Type No.
Argentina Emerging 1
Australia Developed 8
Austria Developed 2
Belgium Developed 2
Bermuda Developed 1
Brazil Emerging 4
Canada Developed 6
China Emerging 1
Colombia Emerging 1
Czech Republic Emerging 4
Denmark Developed 1
Dubai Developed 1
Fijia 1
France Developed 8
Germany Developed 20
Greece Developed 1
Hong Kong Developed 1
Ireland Developed 2
Israel Emerging 1
Italy Developed 6
Japan Developed 2
Malaysia Emerging 3
Netherlands Developed 7
Nigeria Emerging 1
Philippines Emerging 1
Poland Emerging 1
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Pn
jZ1Kjt is the average rank across n securities on
day t of the D þ E day combined estimation and event
period.
Data collection and sample selection
This study is based on acquisitions which were announced
by Indian corporations, listed on the Bombay Stock Ex-
change, during the period January 2003 to December 2008.
Thomson SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions Database
has been used for the data. The announcement dates have
been verified from the archives of corporate announce-
ments on the Bombay Stock Exchange.
Sample selection procedure
All transactions that fulfil the following conditions have
been selected:
 Companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange
 Mergers and acquisitions of controlling stake and above
announced and completed between January 2003 and
December 2008.
 Acquisitions in the financial sector are excluded from
the sample. This is because of the different nature of
assets and liabilities of financial firms and the different
financial reporting of these companies.
 In order to remain in the sample, the shares of the
acquiring company must have been traded for at least
185 days.
 To measure the effect of each acquisition properly, an
acquisition that followed within a year of an earlier one
are excluded from the sample. If a firm has more than
one acquisition within a year, then only the first
acquisition is considered.
 To avoid possible information contamination or the
confounding effect, the firms that undertake any sig-
nificant event within twenty days prior and after the
acquisition are excluded from the sample. Table 1
contains the details of selection of the final sample.Table 1 Details of sample.
Total number of cross-border announcements 1257
Less
{Pending, rumours, withdrawn and denial
of news for acquisitions
341
Acquisitions of business, assets, divisions
and minor stakes
241
Acquisitions by financial sector companies 43
Acquisitions by unlisted companies and
investor groups
167
Trading data not available 65
Acquisition in the same year 21
Confounding events 86
More than one type of acquisition in one
announcement
12
Multiple acquisitions in one announcement} 25
Selected for the study (1257e1001) 256
Source: Thompson SDC Database, 2003e2008.The final sample consists of 256 cross-border acquisitions
of which 218 target firms were located in developed mar-
kets, 35 target firms in emerging markets, and 3 in devel-
oping markets as per World Bank classification. Fiji,
Uzbekistan and Zambia are developing markets as per
World Bank classification and are included as emerging
markets in this paper. Table 2 reveals the geographic dis-
tribution of the sample.Portugal Developed 1
Romania Emerging 3
Russia Emerging 1
Sharjah Emerging 1
Singapore Developed 9
South Africa Emerging 7
South Korea Emerging 1
Spain Developed 3
Sweden Developed 4
Switzerland Developed 5
Thailand Emerging 3
UK Developed 29
USA Developed 98
Uzbekistana 1
Venezuela Emerging 1
Wrexham Developed 1
Zambiaa 1
Total 256
a Developing markets as per World Bank classification,
included in emerging markets in this paper.
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Market response to announcements of cross-border
acquisitions
Table 3 reports the abnormal returns to the acquirer
shareholders on the announcement day and multi-period
event windows for cross-border M&A. It contains average
abnormal return, cumulative average abnormal return, and
median abnormal return. Additionally, it presents propor-
tion of positive and negative average abnormal return. It
also provides the results of parametric and non-parametric
tests conducted to measure statistical significance for
average abnormal returns and cumulative average
abnormal returns.
It is evident from the table that acquirer shareholders
earn average abnormal returns of 1.60% on the announce-
ment day for cross-border M&A; the value is significant at
1% percent. The proportion of stocks having positive return
on the announcement day is more than 66%. The proportion
of stocks having positive return is significant at 1%. Median
abnormal returns are 1.15%.
Relevant data contained in Table 3 also shows that the
acquirer shareholders experience CAAR of 2.74% and 2.64%
during event windows of 11 days (5, þ5) and 5 days (2,
þ2) respectively. The CAAR during pre-event window of 19
days (20, 2) is 2.22%. The CAAR during the short -event
window of two days (1, 0) and three days (1, þ1) is
2.07% and 2.31% respectively. The maximum CAAR of
almost three per cent (2.97%) is observed during pre-event
window of six days (5, 0). All these results are significant
at 1%. One notable finding is that the positive CAAR along
with impressive precision-weighted CAAR sustain for longer
event windows of twenty one days (10, þ10) and forty one
days (20, þ20). But acquisitions reduce wealth signifi-
cantly during post-event window of 19 days (þ2, þ20). The
negative abnormal returns are 2.79% (significant at 1%) for
the post-event window (þ2, þ20). However, the positiveTable 3 Abnormal returns to shareholders of acquiring firms (c
multi-days event windows, 2003e2008.
Event window Average abnormal return Positive: Neg
Cumulative Median
(20,2) 2.22% 1.65% 145:111
(5,0) 2.97% 1.70% 159:97
(1,0) 2.07% 1.14% 170:86
(0, 0) 1.60% 1.15% 168:88
(0,þ1) 1.84% 1.12% 165:91
(0,þ5) 1.38% 0.48% 138:118
(þ2,þ20) 2.79% 2.93% 101:155
(1,þ1) 2.31% 1.61% 163:93
(2,þ2) 2.64% 1.65% 163:93
(5,þ5) 2.74% 2.06% 152:104
(10,þ10) 2.06% 1.44% 145:111
(20,þ20) 1.74% 1.55% 146:110
(20,þ60) 1.03% 0.96% 142:114
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.returns of marginal 1.03% are observed during the longer
event window (20, þ60). However, the results are
marginally significant at 5%.
Figs. 1 and 2 display the trend of AAR and CAAR during
pre and post windows (20, þ20). The graph shows that
abnormal returns increase up to the tenth day post-
acquisition and then starts falling but remains positive
during the event window.
Market response to announcements of acquisitions
of target firms in developed markets
Table 4 illustrates the impact of announcements of cross-
border acquisitions of target firms located in developed
markets across various event windows by reporting the
CAAR values and their corresponding test statistic values.
The CAAR values across various pre-announcement event
windows (20, 2) and (5, 0) are 1.65% and 2.92%
respectively. The CAAR values for the window (5, 0) is
maximum and significant at 1%level. This announcement
effect during the event windows (1, 0), (0, þ1), (1, þ1)
(2, þ2) and (5, þ5) has been interpreted by analysing
the CAAR values of 2.15%, 1.89%, 2.39%, 2.81% and 2.85%
respectively. These values are highly significant at 1%ross-border M&A, N Z 256) on announcement day and during
ative Parametric tests Non-parametric tests
CDA t SCS Z GSign Z Rank Z
2.453* 2.692** 3.586** 2.525*
5.823** 5.898** 5.344** 5.610**
7.024** 5.972** 6.724** 6.379**
7.704** 6.324** 6.473** 7.059**
6.266** 5.390** 6.097** 5.508**
2.709** 2.930** 2.708** 2.288*
3.079** 3.031** 1.936 2.868**
6.403** 5.540** 5.846** 5.630**
5.681** 5.428** 5.846** 5.243**
3.978** 4.209** 4.465** 3.705**
2.162* 2.414* 3.586** 1.531
1.306 1.724 3.712** 1.29
1.024 1.46 2.244* 1.34
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Figure 2 CAAR of cross-border M&A over event window (20,
þ20).
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Figure 3 AAR over event window (20, þ20) of cross-border
acquisitions in developed markets.
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Figure 4 CAAR over event window (20, þ20) of cross-
border acquisitions in developed markets.
Market response to internationalization strategies 87indicating that null hypothesis of zero CAAR has been
rejected.
During the post-announcement windows (þ2, þ5),
(þ2, þ10), (þ2, þ15) and (þ2, þ20), there is a consistent
fall in the CAAR values indicating that the positive reac-
tion is almost nullified by the negative reaction (the peak
value of CAAR declined from 4.14% on day t(þ3) to 1.23%
on day t(þ20)). The CAAR values of 1.81% and 1.21% for
the event window (10, þ10), and (20, þ20), though
positive, are not statistically significant. The graph por-
trayed in Fig. 3 depicts that AAR is positive for twenty
days during the event window. Fig. 4 corroborates the
conclusion that strong positive market reaction generates
high abnormal returns and after announcement, starts
falling and remains positive during the entire event
window.
Market response to announcements of acquisitions
of target firms in emerging markets
Table 5 illustrates the impact of announcements of cross-
border acquisitions of target firms in emerging markets.
The CAAR values across various pre-announcement event
windows (20, 2) and (5, 0) are 5.52% and 1.57%
respectively. The CAAR values are significant at 5% level.Table 4 Abnormal returns to shareholders of acquiring firms o
announcement day and during multi-days event windows, 2003e
Event window Average abnormal return Positive: Neg
Cumulative Median
(20,2) 1.65% 1.09% 118:100
(5,0) 2.92% 1.83% 136:82
(1,0) 2.15% 1.14% 147:71
(0, 0) 1.65% 1.20% 145:73
(0,þ1) 1.89% 1.31% 140:78
(0,þ5) 1.58% 0.51% 118:100
(þ2,þ20) 2.82% 2.93% 85:133
(1,þ1) 2.39% 1.83% 139:79
(2,þ2) 2.81% 1.80% 140:78
(5,þ5) 2.85% 2.24% 129:89
(10,þ10) 1.81% 1.46% 124:94
(20,þ20) 1.21% 1.42% 121:97
(20,þ60) 1.14% 0.92% 120:98
* and **denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively.This announcement effect during the event windows
(1, 0), (0, þ1), (1, þ1) has been interpreted by analysing
the CAAR values of 1.61%, 1.57% and 1.84%, respectively.
These values are significant at 5% indicating that null hy-
pothesis of zero CAAR has been rejected. During the post-
announcement windows (þ2, þ20), there is a little decline
in the CAAR values indicating that the positive reaction
almost sustains during the event window (the peak value of
CAAR declined from 7.36% on day t(þ1) to 4.76% on day
t(þ20)). The CAAR values of 1.67%, 2.11%, 3.47%, and 4.75%
for the event window (2, þ2) (5, þ5) (10, þ10) and
(20, þ20), though positive, are not statisticallyf cross-border acquisitions (developed markets N Z 218) on
2008.
ative Parametric tests Non-parametric tests
CDA t SCS Z GSign Z Rank Z
1.608 1.898 2.572* 1.506
5.069** 5.079** 5.021** 4.629**
6.449** 5.653** 6.517** 5.987**
7.004** 5.822** 6.245** 6.517**
5.683** 4.987** 5.565** 5.080**
2.745** 3.087** 2.572* 2.418*
2.753** 2.561* 1.916 2.266*
5.861** 5.241** 5.429** 5.274**
5.345** 5.334** 5.565** 4.933**
3.659** 3.967** 4.069** 3.240**
1.684 1.989* 3.389** 1.101
0.806 1.274 2.981** 0.909
1.682 1.542 2.141* 1.67
Table 5 Abnormal returns to shareholders of acquiring firms of cross-border acquisitions (emerging markets N Z 38) on
announcement day and during multi-days event windows, 2003e2008.
Event window Average abnormal return Positive: Negative Parametric tests Non-parametric tests
Cumulative Median CDA t SCS Z GSign Z Rank Z
(20,2) 5.52% 3.01% 27:11 2.969** 2.113* 3.147** 3.191**
(5,0) 3.23% 1.57% 23:15 3.089** 3.739** 1.844 3.715**
(1,0) 1.61% 1.08% 23:15 2.671** 1.940 1.844 2.328*
(0, 0) 1.57% 0.59% 25:13 2.603** 2.052* 2.495* 2.245*
(0,þ1) 1.34% 0.80% 23:15 3.148** 2.584** 1.844 2.863**
(0,þ5) 0.23% 0.04% 20:18 0.215 0.048 0.867 0.123
(þ2,þ20) 2.61% 3.12% 16:22 1.406 1.812 0.436 2.169*
(1,þ1) 1.84% 1.18% 24:14 2.489* 1.788 2.170* 2.080*
(-2,þ2) 1.67% 1.03% 23:15 1.751 1.312 1.844 1.880
(5,þ5) 2.11% 1.52% 23:15 1.492 1.391 1.844 1.971*
(10,þ10) 3.47% 1.02% 21:17 1.773 1.596 1.192 1.437
(20,þ20) 4.75% 1.86% 25:13 1.737 1.543 2.495* 1.258
(20,þ60) 1.26% 0.88% 22: 16 1.564 1.628 2.12* 1.48
* and **denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
88 N. Rani et al.significant. The graph portrayed in Fig. 5 depicts that AAR is
positive for 20 days during the event window. Fig. 6 cor-
roborates the conclusion that strong positive market reac-
tion for target firms located in emerging markets also
generates positive abnormal returns and remains positive
during the entire event window.Analysis of determinants on acquiring
shareholders’ wealth in cross-border acquisitions
In addition to the event study, regression analysis has been
carried out to examine the impact of specific bid factors on
returns. There are 67 acquisitions in which the deal value is
undisclosed. This reduces the sample size for final analysis.
The number of observations used is lower (N Z 189) in the
final analysis due to availability of information and missing
bid-specific values. The final sample consisted of 189 target
firms, out of which 160 target firms are in developedmarkets
and 29 in emerging markets. The following firm-specific
characteristics have been used in the regression model.Acquirer size: Size of the acquiring company has been used as Log of Market Value of the acquirer (LogMVA).
Relative size: Value of deal/market value of the acquirer. Log of Relative Size (LogRSize) is used
High tech: “1” if the target is defined as High Tech by SDC Thomson Financial Database on M&A and “0”
otherwise. The final sample consists of acquisitions 113 target firms in high tech sector and
76 in others
Target firms in
developed markets
“1” if the target firm is in developed (Dev) market and “0” if the target firm is in emerging market.The relative size of the deal is included as the log of the
ratio of the transaction value to the market value of the
acquirer following Uysal et al. (2008); Asquith, Bruner, and
Mullins (1983); Jarrell and Poulsen (1989); Kang (1993);
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002).Two regression models have been estimated in the
paper.
Model 1:
CAARiZfþ b1LogMVAi þ b2LogRSizei ð19Þþ b3HighTechi þ εi
Model 2:
CAARiZfþ b1LogMVAi þ b2LogRSizei þ b3HighTechi ð20Þþ b4Devi þ εi
Table 6 describes the results of ordinary least square
regression. The results presented consist of impact of
various determinants on the shareholders wealth of the
acquiring company in cross-border acquisitions. The
dependent variable is CAAR during event window (5, þ5).
The range of variance inflation factor (VIF) varies from 1.07
to 3.23. The mean VIF value (Z2.12) indicates no serious
issue with the multi-collinearity among variables. Further,heteroscedascticity-consistent standard errors have been
used to compute t-statistics.
The coefficient of variable relative size is positive and
statistically significant which implies that shareholders of
Indian acquiring firms experience superior gains when
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Figure 5 CAAR over event window (20, þ20) of cross-border acquisitions of target firms in emerging markets.
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Figure 6 CAAR over event window (20, þ20) of cross-
border acquisitions of target firms in emerging markets.
Market response to internationalization strategies 89acquisitions are of higher deal size. This result is consistent
with the findings reported by Bhagat et al. (2011).
The coefficient of the variable high-tech is positive
and statistically significant which reveals that the cross-
border acquisitions of target firms in high tech sector
create superior wealth gains. The relatively higher gains
to the firms in high tech sector imply that Indian acquiring
firms have increasingly used acquisitions as a means to tap
into strategic resources across borders, particularly in
developed economies that are viewed as sources
of innovation. Moreover, the expected gains from inter-
nalizing host country market imperfections are also
discounted into higher value of the acquiring firms.
Cross-border acquisitions provide synergies related to
internationalization of both tangible and intangible
resources.Table 6 Results of OLS regression model with CAAR (11
days event window) as dependent variable.
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 3.524 (2.41) 4.637* (2.34)
LogMVA 0.05 (1.62) 0.04 (1.56)
LogRSize 1.31** (4.76) 1.19** (5.13)
HighTech 1.83 (1.98*) 1.67 (2.12*)
Dev 1.47 (2.35*)
F statistics 6.42** 6.74**
Adjusted R Square 0.14 0.15
N 189 189
* and **denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively.Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to review the recent changing
pattern of internationalization strategies of firms in
emerging markets in general and India in particular. A shift
from asset exploitation to asset-seeking has been noticed.
The present paper measures the market response to the
announcement of cross-border M&A. The paper aims to
investigate whether cross-border mergers and acquisitions
create value and whether the value effect differs for tar-
gets in developed markets and emerging markets. This
paper focusses on the value effects to shareholders of the
acquiring company. An event study methodology has been
used to explore the short-term shareholder wealth effects
of the Indian acquirers during the period 2003 to 2008. This
paper finds evidence that shareholders of acquirer Indian
corporations engaging in cross-border transactions experi-
ence a statistically significant positive abnormal return on
the announcement day as well as statistically cumulative
abnormal returns over multi-day event windows.
The empirical findings suggest that cross-border trans-
actions result in wealth creation for shareholders of the
Indian acquirers. The gains are significantly positive for the
acquisitions of targets in developed markets as well as
emerging markets. Regression analysis reveals that the
value creation is higher in case of acquisition of relatively
larger deals involving target firms of high tech sector in
developed markets.
Cross-border acquisitions may generate benefits from
geographical diversifications when transactions bring
value from intangible assets, global brands, information
technology, and R&D based knowledge. The finding that
cross-border acquisitions of target firms in developed
markets and in the high-tech sector create higher value
is consistent with Eun, Kolodny, and Scheraga (1996);
Conn et al. (2005); Pyykko (2009); Gubbi et al., (2010);
and Kohli and Mann (2012). Indian companies use the
acquisition route to obtain strategic resources in an
attempt to strengthen their international competitive
edge. Asset-seeking acquisitions, therefore, have been
increasingly used as a means for Indian acquirers to tap
into strategic resources across borders, particularly in
developed economies that are viewed as sources of
innovation. Moreover, the expected gains from internal-
izing host country market imperfections are also dis-
counted into higher value of the acquiring firms. Cross-
90 N. Rani et al.border acquisitions provide synergies related to interna-
tionalization of both tangible and intangible resources.
The stock market values these transactions as it takes
time to develop these resources internally. Acquisitions of
global brands, and access to production technology and
distribution channels offer an international competitive
edge to Indian acquirers.
These findings have important implications for Indian
acquiring firm managers, who may view the initial increase
in stock price around announcement dates as a signal for
positive shareholder response. The acquisitions of strategic
assets may bring significant competitive advantages to In-
dian acquirers, thereby enhancing global competitiveness
also perceived by stock market through positive market
reaction. Further, with a more complete understanding of
asset-seeking motive, Indian acquiring firms may consider
the strategy of acquiring strategic assets to enhance
competitiveness.
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